China’s espionage facilities at sea
By Andrei ChangColumn: Military Might
Published: October 02, 2008
Font size: Hong Kong, China — For some time China has been constructing large-scale underground nuclear submarine facilities on its southern island of Hainan. At the same time, the PLA Navy and Air Force have dramatically reinforced their military structures on the Xisha Islands – known in the West as the Paracel Islands – located in the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam.
The largest military airport in the South China Sea and a super signal and intelligence monitoring station have already been completed on the islands. Recent satellite photos show that the antennas of this intelligence station and related facilities occupy almost the whole of a small island adjacent to Woody Island, where the airport is located. An artificial causeway has been constructed to connect these two islands.
The photos show the smaller island dotted with a mass of radar antennas. Several large vertical high-frequency monitoring antennas are in evidence, which could cover virtually the whole of the South China Sea, all the territory of Vietnam and the Philippines and even high-frequency signals from Malaysia. In addition there are at least two radar signal detectors and receivers.
Alongside these antennas, four bungalow-shaped structures have been built, apparently used for recording and processing signal intelligence. Judging from the types of antennas deployed on this island, it is clear that they are used for the acquisition of both radio and radar wave intelligence.
The immense scale of these listening facilities suggests that this base is most likely under the jurisdiction of the No. 3 and No. 4 Departments under the PLA Headquarters of the General Staff. The No. 3 Department is responsible for the collection and analysis of wireless intelligence, while the No.4 Department takes charge of the collection and processing of electronic confrontation and radar wave intelligence. These two departments were established in 1973 after the Fourth Arab-Israeli War.
The airport on Woody Island in the Paracels has undergone considerable revamping and reconstruction. Its runway has been extended to 2,500 meters (8,200 feet) and can handle landings by any of the third-generation combat fighters currently in service in the PLA Air Force, including the Su-30MKK.
A radar navigation station has been built at the airport, plus four large fuel tanks. This means that China’s combat aircraft, including the J-8II, J-10A and Su-30MKK, can use this airport as a forward deployment base for refueling while on combat missions. Four aircraft hangars have been newly built, which could be used either for servicing the aircraft when necessary or for the transfer of the fighters. Each of the hangars can accommodate two fighter aircraft.
The naval base on Woody Island has also been upgraded, including the construction of a new anti-wave dyke. The length of the dock is more than 500 meters (1,640 feet), and there are no technical barriers to the anchoring of large-tonnage missile destroyers or frigates.
Facilities on the island are sufficient to accommodate the daily lives of more than 1,000 people. Evidently, this island has become a key comprehensive base of the PLA Navy and Air Force for the monitoring of intelligence. It seems that at least one landing craft would come each week to deliver provisions, including all types of fuel and food supplies.
China has territorial disputes in the South China Sea with Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. A military intelligence source from Taiwan claims that since April of this year, Chinese maritime surveillance ships have made frequent appearances in the waters around the Dongsha Islands, also known as the Pratas, which are administered by Taiwan. A Southeast Asian military intelligence source also reported the sighting of at least one Chinese reconnaissance ship in the South China Sea in May.
In the event of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Woody Island could be used by Chinese forces as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and an intelligence station to monitor U.S. navy warships sailing north to support Taiwan. In the event of a broader regional conflict, the combat radius of the Su-27SKs and Su-30MKKs taking off from Woody Island would allow them to cover the whole of the South China Sea, Brunei, northern Malaysia and Manila in the Philippines.
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(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
sexta-feira, 3 de outubro de 2008
Reflexão vinda da Bulgária
FROM THE EDITOR: The State Agency for National Security
10:00 Fri 03 Oct 2008
In any democracy, the question of the relationship between the legislature and the security services is a difficult one.
Even in a democracy, there is a need for the operations of the security services to be covert and, by definition, secure. Transparency in just how campaigns against terrorism and organised crime has to be compromised for such campaigns to be effective.
At the same time, there is always the risk of security services operating in a way that is not in accordance with their legislative guidelines, and worse, being manipulated as a political tool.
The current saga involving Bulgaria’s State Agency for National Security started after requests to examine the phone records of some MPs. While accounts vary, the explanation has been offered that these requests were linked to an attempt to unmask a mole who had been leaking information to various media.
While there may be sensitivity about MPs being subjected to investigation by the security services, at least one MP whose phone records were requested has said that she did not believe that MPs should be beyond scrutiny in the event of a security breach.
Signals have been confused. One senior official has been dismissed but both the President and the Prime Minister have leapt to defend the agency, with President Georgi Purvanov reportedly suggesting that politicians should not be allowed to probe into security structures.
Clearly, whatever the intentions were with regard to the agency, things are not working as they should. Rather than the current ad hoc crisis management, and the unfortunate circumstance that the controversy has led to suggestions from some quarters that the agency is being used as a form of “political police” there need to be clear, properly enforced, guidelines in place for the operation of the agency, and this enforcement needs to be scrutinised by democratically elected structures, if needs be by a body composed of members themselves subject to security clearances and bound to confidentiality – a procedure for which there is precedent in democratic countries.
10:00 Fri 03 Oct 2008
In any democracy, the question of the relationship between the legislature and the security services is a difficult one.
Even in a democracy, there is a need for the operations of the security services to be covert and, by definition, secure. Transparency in just how campaigns against terrorism and organised crime has to be compromised for such campaigns to be effective.
At the same time, there is always the risk of security services operating in a way that is not in accordance with their legislative guidelines, and worse, being manipulated as a political tool.
The current saga involving Bulgaria’s State Agency for National Security started after requests to examine the phone records of some MPs. While accounts vary, the explanation has been offered that these requests were linked to an attempt to unmask a mole who had been leaking information to various media.
While there may be sensitivity about MPs being subjected to investigation by the security services, at least one MP whose phone records were requested has said that she did not believe that MPs should be beyond scrutiny in the event of a security breach.
Signals have been confused. One senior official has been dismissed but both the President and the Prime Minister have leapt to defend the agency, with President Georgi Purvanov reportedly suggesting that politicians should not be allowed to probe into security structures.
Clearly, whatever the intentions were with regard to the agency, things are not working as they should. Rather than the current ad hoc crisis management, and the unfortunate circumstance that the controversy has led to suggestions from some quarters that the agency is being used as a form of “political police” there need to be clear, properly enforced, guidelines in place for the operation of the agency, and this enforcement needs to be scrutinised by democratically elected structures, if needs be by a body composed of members themselves subject to security clearances and bound to confidentiality – a procedure for which there is precedent in democratic countries.
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